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Abstract
In all markets, firms go through a process of creative destruction: entry, ran-
dom growth and exit. In many of these markets there are also regulations that
restrict entry, possibly distorting this process. We study the public interest ratio-
nale for entry taxes in a general equilibrium model with free entry and exit of
firms in which firm dynamics are driven by reputation concerns. In our model
firms can produce high-quality output by making a costly but efficient initial un-
observable investment. If buyers never learn about this investment, an extreme
“lemons problem” develops, no firm invests, and the market shuts down. Learn-
ing introduces reputation incentives such that a fraction of entrants do invest. We
show that, if the market operates with spot prices, entry taxes always enhance the
role of reputation to induce investment, improving welfare despite the impact of
these taxes on equilibrium prices and total production.
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1 Introduction
Creative destruction in capitalist economies is ubiquitous: even within narrowly de-
fined industries, there is an ongoing process of churning through which firms enter,
undergo random growth, and exit. At the same time, attempts by governments to
regulate this process of creative destruction with entry barriers are also ubiquitous,
as documented by Djankov et al. (2002). Is there a public interest rationale for this
regulation of entry? And if so, what are the foundations of this rationale?
One leading view is that firm dynamics are driven by firms’ heterogeneous produc-
tivities and that attempts to regulate the process of firm entry, growth, and exit are
important impediments to aggregate productivity that reduce welfare.1 An alterna-
tive view is that firm dynamics are driven by uncertainty about the quality of new
products or services. If it takes buyers time to learn about the quality of entering
firms, these firms initially face lower demand and prices until they are able to estab-
lish a good reputation for their product. In this view, firms enter small, and their
growth and exit are driven by the evolution of their reputation in the market.2
Concerns about quality are indeed critical in many markets. Firms often make up-
front investments in the quality and safety of their product. Buyers, in turn, interact
infrequently with these firms through spot markets, and it may be difficult to en-
force appropriate and timely compensation for the damages that poor quality prod-
ucts may generate in terms of health, safety hazards, or opportunity costs. Examples
range widely from food or drug safety to many durable goods, and to professional
and consumer services such as doctors, lawyers, home contractors, hotels, restau-
rants, etc.3 In all these markets, quality concerns limit the buyers’ willingness to pay,
and this reduces the firms’ returns to making those upfront quality investments.
1Hopenhayn (1992), Melitz (2003), and Luttmer (2007) present models of the process of creative
destruction driven by the dynamics of firm productivities. Herrendorf and Teixeira (2011) examine
the welfare costs of entry regulation in such a model. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Parente and
Prescott (1999), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and Fattal Jaef (2013) con-
sider other interventions into this process of creative destruction.
2Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2012) present evidence that demand rather than supply factors
drive firm and plant dynamics. Klein and Leffler (1981), Bar-Isaac (2003), Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn
(2010 and 2012), and Vial and Zurita (2012) present reputation-driven models of firm dynamics.
3Even if firms voluntarily guarantee their products against defects, it is still costly for buyers to
use warranties (it is not always clear which defects they cover, it takes time and resources to replace
damaged goods, etc) and they prefer to pay higher prices for products from reputable firms rather
than buy from firms with worse reputations and risk having to use warranties.
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Guaranteeing a minimum product quality is usually cited as the main Pigouvian or
“public interest” rationale for regulating firm entry. Regulatory entry barriers are
meant to discourage firms from entering with low quality products.4 At the same
time, however, regulatory entry barriers impose additional costs which firms pass on
to consumers through higher prices. Moreover, regulatory interventions may not
be needed to enhance quality if the market eventually recognizes quality and re-
wards firms through reputational mechanisms. This suggests that regulation leads
to a non-trivial tradeoff between enhancing quality and distorting prices, with am-
biguous welfare consequences.
In this paper, we analyze the welfare implications of regulatory intervention into the
process of firm entry, growth, and exit through the lens of a simple general equi-
librium model of firm dynamics driven by reputational considerations. As a general
matter, we show that entry regulation is welfare-enhancing, even though reputational
incentives already mitigate adverse selection in the unregulated market. In fact, we
argue that appropriate regulatory interventions complement and enhance the repu-
tational incentives that govern firm dynamics.
In the model, a firm produces high quality output only if it makes a costly initial
investment in quality upon entering the market. Firms can also enter the market
without making this initial investment, but the shoddy output of these low quality
firms detracts from, rather than adds to, social welfare. In equilibrium, firms invest in
quality only if they expect to recoup the investment costs through subsequent quasi-
rents from selling their goods to buyers at a price above marginal cost.
If buyers perfectly observe the firms’ investment in quality, then the spot market equi-
librium is fully efficient, as in Hopenhayn (1992). Instead, we assume that these
investments are not observable by outsiders, and information about entering firms
diffuses only gradually through a process of public signals about the firms’ quality.5
4See, for example, Pigou (1938), Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983 and 1986).
5Learning about a firm’s quality could be the result of public ratings such as those provided by
Consumer Reports (for many durable goods), the Better Business Bureau (for a wide range of busi-
nesses), US News andWorld Report (for colleges), Martindale Hubble (for lawyers), Healthgrades (for
doctors), Angie’s List (for many household services), AAA and Trip Advisor (for tourist hotels), and
Zagats and Michelin (for restaurants), for example. Alternatively, one might interpret learning as the
noisy observation of previous buyers’ experience with the firm’s output. This learning can take a very
public, and sometimes dramatic, form with cases of product failures such as Bridgestone/Firestone
tires recalls after several accidents in 2000, Mattel recalls for lead painted toys in 2007, Toyota recalls
for unintended car accelerations in 2009, or the European horse meat scandal in 2013.
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Some low-quality firms will then enter the market to extract information rents by
pooling at least temporarily with their high-quality peers. This pooling reduces the
quasi-rents high quality firms can extract, which lowers their investment incentives.
The laissez-faire equilibrium thus features strictly lower average quality, a smaller
overall production level, and lower welfare than the first-best allocation with perfect
information.
We develop two principal results on the welfare enhancing role of regulation. First,
we show that a simple combination of entry fees and price subsidies can implement
an allocation arbitrarily close to the first-best with perfect information, even without
altering the buyers’ information about product quality. A regulator can use these two
instruments to target both quality and production, eliminating entry of low quality
firms almost completely, while encouraging efficient entry of high quality firms.
Second, we show that small positive entry costs are welfare-improving even if they
are the only regulatory tool available. The positive impact of small entry fees on
quality more than outweighs the potential negative impact of these fees on equilib-
rium prices and total production. Indeed, for a wide range of information structures,
small entry fees result not only on higher average quality but also in lower reputation-
adjusted equilibrium prices, more aggregate production and higher welfare.
We derive these two main results by analyzing the equilibrium condition that both
low and high quality firms earn zero profits at entry. In equilibrium, the quasi-rents
earned by a firm of either quality depend on its current reputation and the overall
level of production and prices. At the laissez-faire equilibrium in our model, free
entry drives the reputation of entering firms to a level that completely dissipates the
rents for low-quality entrants. The overall production and price level adjust to offer
high quality entrants just enough quasi-rents to compensate for the investment cost.
A regulatory entry fee limits rent dissipation for low-quality entrants, resulting in rel-
atively fewer low quality entrants and a higher entry reputation than at the laissez-
faire equilibrium. This confirms the Pigouvian argument that entry fees indeed en-
hance quality. But the fee also affects overall production and prices through the incen-
tives to invest in quality. To prove our first result, we show that with a price subsidy,
the regulator can correct the effect of entry fees on prices and align the private and
social returns for high quality entrants, while using the entry fee to almost completely
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eliminate entry by low quality firms.6
Even if entry fees are the only regulatory instrument, imposing small entry fees is
still welfare improving, because the distortions in production only have second-order
welfare costs relative to the gains from enhanced quality. In fact, for a broad range
of information structures that we analyze, the high quality firms’ quasi-rents increase
more than one-for-one with small entry fees, so imposing such a fee enhances these
firms’ ability to recoup the costs of their investment in quality, resulting in more en-
try by high quality firms and more total production. Once entry fees become large
enough, however, further increases start to lower entry incentives by high quality
firms, and thus reduce aggregate production. The optimal entry fee is therefore posi-
tive, but finite.
Our model is cast in discrete time, and in its simplest version the market observes
a single signal of firm quality at the end of the period during which a firm entered.
No further signals are realized for incumbents, and hence their reputations are no
longer updated. This assumption may not seem particularly realistic, but it allows
us to present our core results in the simplest possible setting. This signal structure is
also a natural extension of the information structure in Klein and Leffler (1981).
In a second version, we allow for ongoing arrival of new signals, which seems more
realistic but is also more complicated to analyze. To keep the analysis tractable and
shed light on the forces underlying the tradeoff between quality and total produc-
tion, we restrict ourselves to a symmetric signal information structure, in which buy-
ers learn through gradual accumulation of good and bad signals. In the laissez-faire
equilibrium in this case, firms enter with low prices and revenues, then increasing
or reducing their prices and revenues in a random fashion as good and bad signals
arrive until enough bad signals accumulate to induce low quality firms to exit. A pos-
itive entry fee raises both quality and aggregate production at first, but once the fee is
large enough, a tradeoff between quality and total production emerges, and further
increases in entry fees eventually reduce welfare.
The entry fee has two opposing effects on the speedwith which themarket recognizes
6The assumption of spot transactions is central for this result: With commitment to long term con-
tracts, the first best allocation can be achieved by backloading payments to a seller until the point when
his reputation reaches a sufficiently high level. The combination of entry fees and sales subsidies in
our model serves to replicate the same type of backloading. Regulation is therefore a remedy to the
lack of commitment to long term contracts. MacLeod (2007) also presents results along these lines.
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quality. On the one hand, the regulation reduces the proportion of entrants that are
of low quality. But at the same time, a higher entry reputation also delays the exit by
those low quality firms that do enter. The severity of the tradeoff between average
quality and overall production depends on the strength of this second effect of entry
fees on the exit rate and life expectancy of low quality entrants.
We illustrate this last point with two extreme alternative scenarios with asymmetric
signals. In a bad news scenario, a low quality product is eventually revealed to be
of low quality through the arrival of a perfectly revealing bad signal (such as cases
of sudden safety hazards or product failures), forcing the firm to exit from the mar-
ket. In this case, reputations improve as long as a firm has not experienced a bad
signal, the exit rate and life expectancy of low quality firms is independent of their
entry reputation, and entry fees unambiguously increase both quality and aggregate
production such that low quality firms are completely driven out of the market. In a
good news scenario, a high quality product is eventually revealed to be of high qual-
ity through the arrival of a perfectly revealing good signal (such as technological
break-throughs). In this case, the higher entry reputations induced by an entry fee
are almost completely offset by a corresponding decrease in exit rates of low qual-
ity firms, and the tradeoff between quality and aggregate production emerges even
at the laissez-faire benchmark. Even in this case, however, small positive entry fees
remain welfare improving.
Our analysis connects two mechanisms that provide firms with incentives to invest
in quality: reputation and regulation. There is a rich literature studying each of these
mechanisms in isolation, but to our knowledge they have so far not been systemati-
cally connected. In combining these mechanisms, we show how regulatory interven-
tions can be used to leverage reputational incentives.
The literature on reputation concerns, surveyed recently in MacLeod (2007), views
reputation as a valuable asset that the firm may lose if it is found to act opportunis-
tically (Mailath and Samuelson (2001); Tadelis, 1999 and 2002). The firm’s reputation
is defined as outsider’s beliefs about a hidden firm permanent characteristic, which
is updated based on signals about the firm’s performance.
We embed reputation dynamics in a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics, in
which firms are free to enter or exit the market, and their initial investment deter-
mines the quality of their product. The proportion of firms that make the required
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upfront investments – and hence the reputation assigned to untested new entrants
in equilibrium – adjusts endogenously to the firms’ entry and investment incentives.7
The resulting firm dynamics with free entry and exit then determine the resulting firm
dynamics determine the number of high- and low-quality firms (and their respective
reputations), and hence the severity of the adverse selection problem, in equilibrium.
The general equilibrium model allows us to formalize the trade-off between average
quality and total production that is at the heart of our analysis.
As a technical contribution, we offer a simple restriction on buyer beliefs under which
the equilibrium is unique. In addition, we fully characterize equilibrium value func-
tions, which makes the analysis of entry regulation especially tractable.8
The literature on regulation emphasizes how entry regulation can be welfare improv-
ing in settings with adverse selection and moral hazard. Klein and Leffler (1981, p.
168) highlight that the need to incentivize quality provision through quasi-rents ex
post is inconsistent with free entry of firms, unless these quasi-rents are dissipated
at entry through advertisement, brand marketing or other forms of money-burning.
However, since they present a partial equilibrium model without explicit consumer
preferences or information, they do not explicitly discuss normative questions, wel-
fare analysis, or regulatory interventions. Shapiro (1983) introduces a reputation for-
mation interpretation of Klein and Leffler (1981, p. 168). He explicitly models con-
sumers’ preferences and shows that regulatory interventions that target quality di-
rectly, such as minimum quality standards, reduce the premium necessary to induce
high quality. The welfare effects of such interventions trade off gains to consumers
who highly value better quality provision against losses to consumers with low value
for quality who are forced to pay for quality that they perceive as excessive.
We depart from this literature in two important respects. First, in our paper entry
costs affect incentives for quality and thereby improve welfare, even if regulators are
not able to identify or target quality.9 This is consistent with the fact that most en-
7While the initial models considered exit to be exogenous, Ho¨rner (2002), Bar-Isaac (2003), and Da-
ley and Green (2012) introduce endogenous exit of firms, when these firms know their own type. None
of these papers consider free entry or quality investments choices that endogenize initial reputations.
8In a previous NBER version of our paper (NBERWorking Paper 17898) we characterize these value
functions in continuous time as well. In contrast to the work of Prat and Alos-Ferrer (2010), Board and
Meyer-ter Vehn (2010) or Faingold and Sannikov (2011), who also exploit the tractability of continuous
time, we derive value functions with both endogenous entry and exit.
9Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Arnott, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (1993) discuss the scope for
Pareto improving interventions, even if information imperfections cannot be directly overcome. In
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try regulations in practice are not explicitly designed to screen entrants for quality.10
Second, instead of focusing on a utilitarian welfare criterion with heterogeneous con-
sumer preferences as in Shapiro (1983) and much of the related literature, our model
admits a representative household interpretation. Regulation affects welfare through
its impact on aggregate production and is therefore fully Pareto-improving.11 Our
analysis thus embeds the hold-up problem identified by Klein and Leffler (1981, p.
168) in a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics, which allows us to analyze
regulatory interventions from a macro-economic perspective.
In the following section, we describe the economy and characterize the spot market
equilibrium for two extreme benchmarks: full information and no learning. In Sec-
tion 3 we characterize the spot market equilibrium in steady-state with imperfectly
informative signals. In Section 4 we discuss the effects of regulation on equilibrium
outcomes. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the economic environment, define a spot market equilib-
rium with regulation, and show that under full information, the spot market equilib-
rium without regulation implements the socially optimal allocation.
our model, the spot market outcome is not constrained Pareto optimal, because buyers and sellers are
unable to commit to dynamic contracts with payments that differ from spot prices. Entry regulation
is Pareto improving if it replicates the commitment to backloading of rewards that the market cannot
generate on its own. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of other market-based solutions
to the commitment problem through, e.g., longer-term contracts, posting of bonds, or market-provided
intermediation and certification services.
10Djankov et al. (2002) offer an extensive list of entry procedures which are required in many coun-
tries. The vast majority are related purely to screening and registration for tax purposes. To the extent
that inspection and certification takes place, it is related to labor, work place safety, health and environ-
mental standards, but not provider quality. Educational standards or professional licences that certify
the operator’s expertise are the main type of regulation that explicitly targets provider quality.
11In Leland (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1981) and Shapiro (1983 and 1986), entry costs improve
welfare with asymmetric information if there is enough heterogeneity in how consumers value quality
and regulation improves provision of quality to those consumers that value it highly. But these are not
Pareto improvements since those consumers who prefer low quality are harmed. Similarly, in Garcia-
Fontes and Hopenhayn (2000) entry restrictions can improve welfare by their effect on the market size,
but because the pool of consumers, heterogenous in their preferences, change.
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2.1 The Economy
Time is discrete with time periods numbered t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At each time t, consumers
derive utility from a final good, whose consumption is denoted by Yt, and a numeraire
good, whose consumption is denoted byNt. These goods are non-storable. Consumer
preferences are given by
1X
t=0
 t (U(Yt) +Nt) , (1)
where U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0, U 0(0) =1, limY!1 U 0(Y ) = 0, and   2 (0, 1).
At each time t, there is a non-storable endowment of 1 unit of the numeraire good.
The final good is produced with a constant returns to scale technology that uses pro-
duced intermediate goods as the only inputs. These intermediate goods are of uncer-
tain quality and we refer to them throughout as experience goods because there will be
learning through experiencing their quality.12
Each period, there is a continuum of experience good firms in the economy, each with a
capacity to produce 1 unit of the experience good per period at zero marginal cost for
as long as that firm remains active. Experience good firms can become inactive and
exit either by the owner’s decision, or for exogenous, stochastic reasons.13 Experience
good firms that exit at t cannot return to production at later dates.
New experience good firms enter as high-quality (H) or low-quality (L) firms. An
entering firm must invest K units of the numeraire good to be of high quality. Low-
quality firms can enter at zero cost. We denote the measure of new experience good
firms entering at t by met   0. The fraction of those entrants who invest to become
high-quality is denoted  et 2 [0, 1]. The total numeraire good invested in the creation
of new high-quality firms in period t is therefore K etmet , and the resource constraint





t = 1. (2)
The quality of an experience good firm determines the expected productivity of the
experience good produced by that firm in use as an input to produce the final good.
12Our interpretation of trade being carried out between producers of differentiated intermediate
goods and producers who use those intermediate goods to produce final consumption is standard in
the international trade literature. See, for example, Ethier (1982). The key assumption regarding trade
in our model is that individual buyers and sellers do not engage in long-term trading relationships.
13The assumption of stochastic exit ensures that there is ongoing entry of new firms in steady-state.
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One unit of output from a high-quality experience good firm contributes in expecta-
tion y(1) > 0 units of final goods at the margin, whereas one unit of output from a
low-quality experience good firm contributes in expectation y(0) < 0 units of final
goods at the margin.14 If mHt and mLt denote the measures of high- and low-quality
firms active in period t, then aggregate production of the final good in period t is
Yt = y(1)mHt + y(0)mLt. (3)
By assuming that experience goods are perfectly substitutable in the production of the
final consumption good, we obtain the result that the buyers of these intermediates
are competitive final goods firms that have a common valuation and are risk neutral
(have constant marginal valuations of an additional unit of the experience good). At
the same time, we have a final consumer in our model economy with diminishing
marginal utility for aggregate output of the final consumption good generated from
these experience goods. These assumptions allow us to measure social welfare based
on the consumer surplus of a representative household. In particular, we abstract
from the matching and aggregation issues that would arise if individual producers
with different expected qualities sold to individual consumers with diverse valua-
tions for the qualities of the experience good.
Each experience good firm is characterized by its reputation   2 [0, 1], which is defined
as the buyers’ public belief (probability) that the firm is of high quality. The expected
contribution to production of the final good by the output of an experience good firm
with reputation   is denoted y( ) and given by
y( ) =  y(1) + (1   )y(0). (4)
Each firm’s reputation evolves over time through the observation of exogenous sig-
nals about its quality and the firm owner’s decision to remain active, which may be
viewed as an endogenous signal of its quality.
The timing of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of a period t,
new experience good firms enter and choose whether to invest in quality. They all
start with a reputation  et that is equal to the fraction of entering firms that invest
14The assumptions of zero marginal cost of production for the intermediate good and a negative
marginal product of low-quality intermediate goods are normalizations that simplify the exposition,
but do not affect the main results.
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in high quality. All firms (including entrants) then decide, based on their reputation
  2 [0, 1], whether to exit or continue. We denote by !it( ) 2 [0, !¯] the probability that
a firm of quality i = {L,H} and reputation   stays in the market; with probability
1   !it( ), this firm exits. The upper bound !¯ 2 (0, 1) denotes the maximal survival
rate, and then 1  !¯ the exogenous rate of exit.15 Buyers (final good producers) form
interim beliefs  ct( ) 2 [0, 1] about the quality of those firms that, for a given  , chose
to continue. These interim beliefs satisfy Bayes’ Rule whenever applicable. Given
continuation strategies {!Lt(·),!Ht(·)},  ct(·) takes the form
 ct( ) =
 !Ht( )
 !Ht( ) + (1   )!Lt( ) , (5)
whenever max {!Ht( ),!Lt( )} > 0.
Production and trade then occurs at these interim beliefs, with the owners of active
firms selling their output to final good producers. After production and trade have
taken place, public signals about the quality of each experience good firm are realized,
and the firms’ reputations are updated to start the subsequent period t+ 1.
We consider two versions of the signal structure that governs the evolution of firms’
reputations over time. In a Bernoulli trials version, a good or bad public signal is re-
vealed each period after trade for each active experience good firm. These signals
lead to updating of reputations to  t+1 to start period t + 1 for all firms that were ac-
tive in period t. We denote by ↵i the probability that an active experience good firm
of type i 2 {H,L} generates a good signal, and assume without loss of generality that
↵H > ↵L. Given interim beliefs  ct( ), the firm’s reputation entering period t + 1 is










 ct( )(1  ↵H) + (1   ct( ))(1  ↵L)
, (7)
depending on whether a good or a bad signal is realized, respectively.
In a Single trial version, such a signal is realized only for firms that newly entered.
15The assumption that new entrants may choose to immediately exit (or be forced to do so due to
a random exit shock) is only done for analytical convenience, as this allows us to treat the decision
problems for entrants and incumbents in a completely symmetric fashion.
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No further signals are revealed about incumbent firms. A firm that enters in period t
with reputation  et will start period t + 1 with a reputation of  g( ct( et )) or  b( ct( et ))
depending on the realized signal, and will retain this reputation for as long as it re-
mains in production. This signal structure is similar to that in Klein and Leffler (1981)
and makes the equilibrium characterization especially tractable.
The Bernoulli trials version is substantially more involved, so we focus on a symmetric
signals case, ↵H = 1   ↵L, which implies that  g( b( )) =  , i.e. a good signal and a
bad signal exactly offset each other. Details of the analysis for this case are given in
Appendix B.
Denote by ⌫it( ), for i 2 {H,L}, the measures of high- and low quality firms after en-
try has occurred but before exit. The measures of high- and low-quality firms active
in production satisfymit =
R
  !it( )d⌫it( ). The evolution of these measures from one
period to the next is determined in the standard way. First, firms continuation strate-
gies !it( ) reduce the measure of firms through exit. The reputations of those firms
that continue are updated according to buyers’ interim beliefs  ct( ). Second, trade
occurs, signals are observed, and active firms’ reputations are updated according to
Bayes’ rule in (6) and (7). Third, a measure met+1 of firms enters at the beginning of
t + 1 with reputation  et+1, with a fraction  et+1 of those firms being high-quality and
1   et+1 low-quality. These steps define ⌫Ht+1 and ⌫Lt+1.
An allocation in this environment is a sequence of consumption of the final and nu-
meraire goods {Yt, Nt}, measures and initial reputations for entrants {met , et}, buyers’
interim beliefs { ct( )}, and, continuation strategies {!it( )}, reputational distribu-
tions {⌫it( )}, and measures of active firms {mit} for i = {L,H}.
An allocation is feasible if it satisfies the numeraire good and the final good resource
constraints (2) and (3), the constraints on the evolution of the measure of firms by
reputation implied by continuation strategies, buyers’ interim beliefs, and measures
of entry and initial reputations for entrants. An allocation is stationary if it constant in
t. When referring to stationary allocations, we suppress the time subscript.
2.2 Stationary Spot Market Equilibrium
We now consider stationary equilibrium allocations in an economy in which all trans-
actions take place at spot prices. The final good producers buy experience goods at a
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spot market price p( ) (in terms of the numeraire good) from an experience good firm
with reputation  , and consumers buy the final good at a spot market price P . Within
this market we also allow for the use of two simple regulatory tools: (i) a tax F   0
that is imposed on new experience good firms entering the market, and (ii) a subsidy
s per unit of the final good purchased. The net proceeds of these taxes and subsi-
dies are rebated to consumers or financed through lump sum taxes on consumers.
We focus on a stationary spot market equilibrium, in which all prices, quantities and
regulatory tools are constant over time.
The stationary final good price P is given by the marginal utility of the final good,
adjusted for the sales subsidy:
P = (1 + s)U 0(Y ). (8)
The spot market price p( ) for an experience good firm with reputation   is given by
p( ) = y( )P , (9)
and is thus the product of the final good price P and the expected marginal product
y( ) of the experience good in the production of the final good with expectations
based on the reputation of the selling firm.16 p( )/P = y( ) then corresponds to the
flow of normalized profits from an active experience good firm with reputation  .
We let Vi( e) denote the discounted expected value of normalized profits for an experi-
ence good firm of quality i 2 {H,L} that enters with reputation  e. In the Bernoulli
trials version of the model, the value for a new entrant is the same as the beginning-
of-period value of an incumbent with the same reputation, so we can define Vi( ) re-
cursively. Taking buyers’ interim beliefs based on continuation  c( ) as given, Vi( )








g( c( ))) + (1  ↵i)Vi( b( c( )))
 ⇤
, (10)
where  g(·) and  b(·) are defined by (6) and (7). This Bellman equation (10) also de-
16Competition among final good producers in buying the experience goods drives the spot market
prices to their reservation value. Hence experience good producers obtain quasi-rents once they gain
a sufficiently high reputation. In equilibrium, these quasi-rents are dissipated, exactly compensating
firms for their initial investmentK (for high quality firms), regulatory entry costs F , and initial period
of sales at prices below marginal cost when they have initially low reputation.
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fines the set of optimal continuation strategies for a firm of quality i given buyers’
interim beliefs. A continuation strategy !i( ) is a best response to buyers’ interim be-
liefs  c( ) only if !i( ) = !¯ when Vi( ) > 0.
In the single trial version of the model, we work backwards to define the normalized
value functions for entrants, Vi( ). Let




y( c( )) +   bV ( c( ))i
denote the normalized value of an incumbent firm that has already experienced its
signal and is now choosing whether to stay in the market. This is independent of the
firm’s quality since no further signals will separate a high quality firm from its low







↵ibV ( g( c( ))) + (1  ↵i)bV ( b( c( )))⌘i . (11)
Expressed in terms of the numeraire good, an experience good firms’ value at entry
with quality i 2 {H,L} and reputation  e is P · Vi( e). In equilibrium, profits at entry
must be non-positive for both high- and low-quality firms . With a stationary subsidy
s to sales of the final good and entry fees of size F , this requirement is
(1 + s)U 0(Y )VH( e) K   F  0, (12)
with equality if  eme > 0, and
(1 + s)U 0(Y )VL( e)  F  0, (13)
with equality if (1   e)me > 0.
We conclude this sub-section with the definition of a stationary spot market equilibrium.
Definition 1 Stationary spot market equilibrium
A stationary spot market equilibrium consists of a feasible, stationary allocation
{Y,N,me, e, c( ),!i( ), ⌫i( ),mi}, buyers’ interim beliefs  c(·), and normalized value
functions {Vi( )} defined as in (10) or (11) such that
(i) The continuation strategies !i( ) are a best response to buyers’ interim beliefs  c.
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(ii) Buyers’ interim beliefs  c( ) are consistent with the continuation strategies !i( ) as in
(5) where Bayes’ rule is defined, and
(iii) The zero profits on entry conditions (12) and (13) are satisfied.
In what follows, we refer to the equilibrium with F = 0 and s = 0 as the laissez-faire
benchmark without any regulatory interventions. We denote by  elf and Ylf the entry
reputation and final good production in the laissez-faire benchmark.
2.3 Benchmarks: Social Optimum and Spot Market Equilibrium
Full information: For further reference, we briefly discuss the optimality conditions
and spot market equilibrium governing firm entry and output of the final good in
a stationary equilibrium with full information. In our model, high quality experi-
ence good firms are directly analogous to units of capital in the neo-classical growth
model. Therefore, following standard arguments the laissez-faire equilibrium attains
a socially optimal level of entry and production if quality investments are perfectly
observable at the time of entry. No regulation in the form of entry fees for experience
good firms or subsidies to final good sales can improve welfare.
Equating the marginal social cost of creating a new high quality firm, K, to the
marginal benefit in a stationary allocation gives
!¯
1   !¯y(1)U
0(Y¯ ) = K. (14)
where Y¯ denotes the stationary production of the final good with full information.
The optimal stock of high-quality experience good firms is the stock required to pro-
duce stationary output of the final good Y¯ as determined by equation (14). Likewise,
the optimal rate of entry of high quality firms is the rate necessary to maintain that
stock and the optimal fraction of high quality entrants is  e = 1.
These allocations are implemented by a stationary spot market equilibrium with spot
prices p¯( ) = y( )U 0(Y¯ ) and P¯ = U 0(Y¯ ) for intermediate goods produced by firms
with reputation   and for the final good, respectively. Since p¯ (0) < 0, low quality
firms never have an incentive to enter the market. The normalized value associated
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with a high-quality firm at these spot prices is
VH(1) =
!¯
1   !¯y(1) > 0,
and equilibrium entry by high quality firms is characterized by the free entry condi-
tion U 0(Y¯ )VH(1) = K, coinciding with the socially optimal entry and production.17
No information: At the other extreme, if investment is non-observable and signals
remain uninformative (↵H = ↵L), the adverse selection problem associated with free
entry of low-quality firms is so severe that there is no production of the final good in
steady state. If signals are uninformative, then they do not generate updating of buy-
ers’ beliefs, i.e.  g( c) =  b( c) =  c, and it is straight-forward to check that for any
interim belief function  c(·), the normalized value functions for the two types must be
the same, i.e. VH( ) = VL( ). But then given the entry condition for low quality firms
(13), it is impossible to offer high quality experience good firms a sufficient reward
for their investment to enter the market, and therefore  eme = 0, i.e. no high quality
firm entering the market. But once high quality firms have no incentive to enter, the
stationary equilibrium allocation must have no entry of firms at all and hence there
can be no positive production of the final good once the initial stock of high-quality
firms dies out. This argument applies irrespective of the choice of regulatory policies
F and s, implying that regulatory interventions have no effect, if buyers do not have
any access to information about seller quality.
3 Equilibrium with Imperfectly Informative Signals
We now construct a steady-state spot market equilibrium in our model for both the
Single Trial and Bernoulli Trial versions of the model. We show that there is a generic
multiplicity of equilibria in ourmodel associatedwith different configurations of buy-
ers’ interim beliefs about firms’ continuation decisions as summarized in  c( ). We
then present restrictions on those beliefs that ensure in the Bernoulli trials version of
the model that this equilibrium is unique.
17The same argument extends to non-stationary allocations starting from an arbitrary initial distri-
bution of experience good firms.
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3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
In the equilibrium that we construct, buyers beliefs are characterized by a threshold
reputation   such that  c( ) =   for   >   and  c( ) =   for 0 <     . In equilib-
rium, we refer to this threshold reputation   as the exit threshold for low quality firms
as it is the highest reputation for which low quality firms will be willing to exit en-
dogenously. These beliefs are confirmed by continuation strategies for high and low
quality firms in which high quality firms choose to continue to the extent possible for
all   > 0, (!H( ) = !¯), and low quality firms do the same for       and otherwise
randomize over continuation and exit with !L( ) < !¯ set so that Bayes Rule in (5)
implies  c( ) =   for   <  . Therefore, in our equilibrium, all active firms’ interim
reputations remain in an interval [ , 1].





have bV ( ) = !¯/ (1   !¯) ·max 0, y  max  ,    and the exit threshold for low qual-
ity firms   must satisfy y( ) = 0. Both high and low quality firms earn zero profits
when     , even if they randomize their continuation decision and remain active,
as conjectured above. The normalized value at entry then satisfies (11)for i 2 {H,L},
i.e. high and low-quality entrants, with bV ( ) as above and  c( ) = max  ,  .
To construct the exit threshold   in the Bernoulli Trials version of the model, consider
first the solution V ⇤L (·) to the following auxiliary Bellman equation:









g( )) + (1  ↵L)V ⇤L ( b( ))
 ⇤
. (15)
This auxiliary Bellman equation corresponds to a standard exit option problem of a
low-quality firm that faces beliefs  c( ) =   for all  . The solution to this problem
defines a unique optimal exit threshold   2 (0, 1) such that V ⇤L ( ) is positive and
strictly increasing for all   >   and V ⇤L ( ) = 0 for     . With this construction of  ,
it’s a straight-forward matter to check that the function V ⇤L (·) also solves the original





That is, when facing beliefs  c( ) = max{ , }, a low quality firm would optimally
chose to remain active as long as   >  , but exit with positive probability once its
reputation level drops below the threshold  . Moreover, given these buyers’ beliefs
we compute VH(·), and since VH( ) > VL( )   0, high quality firms always strive to
continue, as conjectured above.
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these first two steps of constructing buyers’ beliefs and
firms’ value functions and continuation decisions for the Bernoulli trials case.18
Figure 1: Continuation Decisions and Interim Reputation







































In both versions of the model, the free entry conditions (12) and (13) for high and
low quality firms must hold with equality. It follows from our regularity conditions
on U(·) that these free entry conditions determine a unique well defined equilibrium
entry reputation  e and production of the final good Y . Given the hypothesized entry
and continuation strategies for high and low quality firms, it is then a straightforward
calculation to compute the entry rateme and the consumption of the numeraire good
N consistent with  e and Y .
To summarize, we have established the following result:
Proposition 1 Stationary spot market equilibrium with Bernoulli Trials.
Let   be defined by VL( ) = 0 where VL(·) solves Bellman equation (15), and let VH(·) be




. Given regulatory policies F   0
and s   0, there exists a stationary spot market equilibrium in which:
(i) High quality firms always strive to continue (!H( ) = !¯). Low quality firms strive to
continue (!L( ) = !¯) if      , but randomize over continuation (!L( ) < !¯) when   <  .
18The figures were constructed assuming the continuous time limit and a signal structure that fol-
lows a Brownian motion process.
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Figure 2: Value Functions: Brownian diffusion
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(iii) The entry reputation and steady-state output are determined by free entry (12) and (13).
The same proposition applies to the single trial version after adjusting for the con-
struction of the equilibrium value functions.
Equilibrium Uniqueness. The equilibrium we have constructed above is not unique
without further restrictions on buyers’ beliefs. In particular, in the Single Trial version
of the model, there is an alternative configuration of beliefs with  c( ) =   for all  
and continuation strategies !i( ) = !¯ for       and !i( ) = 0, which is otherwise
consistent with the same solutions for Vi( ),  ,  e, and Y , but different solutions forN
andme since these quantities are impacted by the exit decisions of high quality firms
that receive the bad signal, !H( b( e)). An equilibrium with  c( ) =   for all   can
also be sustained in the Bernoulli Trials version of the model, if  b( ) is low enough
so that high quality firms with reputation  b( ) have negative discounted present
values of profits when facing interim beliefs  c( ) =   for all  . These equilibria
feature socially inefficient exit by high quality firms.
Our next result shows that, if time periods in the model are ”sufficiently short”, the
equilibrium characterized by proposition 1 is the unique equilibrium in which buy-
ers’ interim beliefs satisfy the (arguably reasonable) restriction that continuation is
18
seen as a positive signal of firm quality. To state our result, let   denote the low





. Let V ⇤H(·) the value function of a high quality firm, when facing
interim beliefs  c( ) =   for all  .
Proposition 2 Equilibrium Uniqueness: Suppose that y (0) +  ↵HV ⇤H
 
 
    0. Then,
in the Bernoulli trials version of the model, the equilibrium characterized in proposition 1 is
the unique stationary spot market equilibrium with positive entry in which ”Continuation
signals Quality”:  c( )     for all   2 [0, 1].
The condition y (0) +  ↵HV ⇤H
 
 
    0 compares the one period flow payoff of a firm





of a high-quality firm with a reputation at  , scaled by the high quality
firm’s probability of a good signal ↵H . Therefore, unless the arrival rate of a good sig-
nal ↵H also scales with calendar time, this condition is automatically satisfied when
time periods are sufficiently short in calendar time.
The restriction on beliefs that ”Continuation signals Quality” can be motivated in
several ways.19 Suppose for example that any firm that wishes to exit is unable to
do so with some small type-independent probability. This perturbation determines
continuation beliefs by  c( ) =   at any   such that both firms wish to exit for sure,
and thus corresponds to a special case of our criterion.20 But the criterion also resem-
bles forward induction criteria, according to which continuation beliefs should favor
those types that have more to gain from continuation, which in our case would be the
high type firms.
Our uniqueness result is based on an infection logic for which ”Continuation signals
Quality” is crucial. We first show that if  c( )    , any firm with a reputation      
does not have an incentive to exit immediately, regardless of the equilibrium played,
or their type. This in turn determines  c( ) =   for      . Then, if   is sufficiently
close to   and  c( )    , a single good signal will suffice to push the reputation above
  ( g( )    ), giving high types a strict incentive to continue at any equilibrium. But
then low type firms will randomize over their exit, which pins the continuation be-
liefs at   for any   s.t.  g( )    . But then, high types with slightly lower reputations
19An equivalent condition is also imposed in related work by Daley and Green (2012, section 5) who
refer to it as ”belief monotonicity”.
20See Bar-Isaac (2003, section 6) for an analysis of this perturbation in a similar model.
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also recognize that a single positive signal will suffice to push the continuation rep-
utation up to  , which in turn gives these firms a strict incentive to continue etc. If
y (0) +  ↵HV ⇤H
 
 
    0, the same argument eventually applies to any strictly positive
reputation level, so that  c( ) is uniquely pinned down for   > 0.21
In addition to equilibria with inefficient exit, there also exist equilibria with no entry,
which are sustained by an entry reputation of  c( e) =  e = 0 that is never ”tested”
in equilibrium. If y (0) +  ↵HV ⇤H
 
 
    0, these equilibria are not robust to entry by a
small measure of high quality firms, since this would result in a strictly positive entry
reputation  e > 0 and  c( e) =  , by the preceding argument.
This proposition applies only to the Bernoulli Trials version of the model, not the sin-
gle signal version. To obtain that high quality firms have a strict incentive to continue
for reputation levels close to  , we have made use of the fact that VH( ) > VL( ) = 0
whenever both firms continue for any      . This eventually determines continu-
ation incentives for high quality firms at all reputation levels. In the single signal
version instead, the value functions are the same, so there is always an equilibrium
in which both firms exit at the same threshold reputation.22
3.2 The Laissez-faire Benchmark
The entry reputation  elf in the laissez-faire benchmark is derived from the free entry
condition for low quality firms: VL( elf ) = 0. In the Bernoulli Trials version, this
implies that the entry and exit reputation thresholds are the same, i.e.  elf =  . In the
Single Trials version, it must be the case that   >  elf so that low quality firms do not
earn positive profits upon entry.
Given  elf , the level of final good production Ylf at the laissez-faire equilibrium is
derived from the free entry condition for high quality firms: VH( elf )U 0 (Ylf ) = K.
Because VH( elf ) < VH(1), we have the following result for both versions of ourmodel:
21The condition y (0) +  ↵HV ⇤H
 
 
    0 can be further relaxed at the cost of additional notation
by recognizing that along the iteration the the ”worst” sustainable interim belief  c(·) is gradually
improved relative to  c( ) =  . However, the general argument of comparing a ”worst” one-period
payoff against the expected NPV after a single positive signal remains exactly the same.
22The logic of this argument suggests that a uniqueness result can be established as long as addi-








= 0, or that high
quality firms have some other intrinsic reason to stay in the market.
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Proposition 3 The steady-state level of the final good output in the laissez-faire equilibrium
is lower than that in the full information benchmark. That is, Ylf < Y¯ .
This proposition shows that, although reputation mitigates the lemons problem and
allows for some positive production of the final good (relative to the no information
benchmark), production is limited by the fact that high-quality firms can no longer
appropriate the full marginal value of their investments, as they need to endure lower
profits after entry while they accumulate a good reputation. This reduces welfare
relative to the full information benchmark.
Consider now how the informativeness of the signal impacts the equilibrium. The
ratio ↵H/↵L determines the informativeness of a good signal about quality; notice
that  g( e) is increasing in ↵H/↵L for a fixed value of  e. The ratio (1  ↵L) / (1  ↵H)
determines the informativeness of a bad signal about quality;  b( e) is decreasing in
(1  ↵L) / (1  ↵H) for a fixed value of  e. Both signals thus becomemore informative
as ↵H increases or ↵L decreases. In the single trial version, we therefore say that
signals become more informative if ↵H increases or ↵L declines, holding the other
signal probability fixed. In the Bernoulli version, signals become more informative if
↵H increases and (at the same time) ↵L = 1   ↵H declines. For both versions of our
model we show the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The laissez-faire output Ylf increases monotonically with the informativeness
of signals.
The key to the result is to show that at the laissez-faire benchmark the quasi-rents of
high-quality firms at entry, VH( e), are an increasing function of signal informative-
ness. While it is quite intuitive that VH( e) increases with signal informativeness for
a given  e, the equilibrium entry reputation also changes with the signal structure
and turns out to do so non-monotonically. The low quality firms’ incentives to en-
ter depend on the upside chance of enjoying false positive signals. But this upside
chance exists neither for extremely noisy information structures (in which case the
market will simply not update, so the low quality entrant has nothing to gain from
a good signal), nor for extremely informative signal structures (in which case a low
quality entrant would have a lot to gain from favorable signals but the chance of such
a signal occurring vanishes). The low quality firms’ incentive to enter is therefore
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strongest with intermediate signal structures, and the entry reputation is typically a
non-monotonic function of signal informativeness, and lowest at intermediate levels.
Because of this non-monotonicity, we have not been able to offer a general statement
on which of these forces dominate without more specific assumptions about the sig-
nal structure. In the specific signal structure we assume, however, we show that the
direct effect of better signal quality always outweighs the indirect effect of low entry
reputations, and hence laissez-faire output Ylf is always increasing in signal quality.
4 The impact of Regulation on Equilibrium
What is the impact of regulatory entry costs F and sales subsidies s on the stationary
equilibrium quality of entrants  e and the volume of production of the final good
Y ? We answer this question by analyzing the impact of these regulatory instruments
on the free entry conditions for high and low quality firms. Given specific policies
s > 0 and F > 0, the free entry conditions for high and low quality firms define two
schedules of Y as a function of  e that we must solve jointly to find the equilibrium
values of  e and Y . Thus, the existence of an equilibrium and comparative statics of
equilibrium  e and Y with respect to policies depend on the specific shapes of these
two schedules.
Consider first how the choice of a regulatory entry cost F > 0 impacts the equilibrium







which is independent of Y . Therefore, the impact of F on the equilibrium entry rep-
utation  e is determined by the ratio of low to high quality firm’s value functions.
The right hand side of equation (16) is a continuous, strictly increasing function of
F , rising from 0 at F = 0 to 1 as F approaches infinity. The left hand side of this
expression is equal to zero at the laissez-faire benchmark ( e =  elf ), always strictly
less than 1, and converges to one when  e converges to 1 and ↵H < 1. In this case,
for any  e 2 ( elf , 1) desired by the regulator, there exists an entry fee F > 0 for which
the equilibrium entry reputation is  e desired by the regulator, and for each F there
exists (at least) one corresponding entry reputation  e, whenever ↵H < 1. The entry
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reputation is unique and strictly monotonic in F whenever VL( e)/VH( e) is strictly
monotonic in  e. In the Single Trial version of the model, since y( ) is linear in  , this
is always the case, but we have not been able to show a corresponding result for the
Bernoulli Trials version, except for the continuous time limits.23
Equation (16) illustrates how the entry fee affects incentives for quality investments.
For a given entry reputation  e, the value VL( e) corresponds to the surplus or infor-
mation rent that a firm can extract by entering the market as an undetected low type.
At the laissez-faire equilibrium, free entry leads to full dissipation of this information
rent. With an entry fee, low quality firms must earn higher information rents, and
these rents are no longer dissipated, but instead taxed away through the entry fee. At
equilibrium, the increase in information rents results from a shift in the composition
of new entrants: a higher quasi-rent for low quality firms upon entry is possible only
if they enter in smaller proportion and with a higher entry reputation – and hence a
higher average quality of entrants.24
Now consider how the sales subsidy s impacts the steady-state production of the final
good Y given an entry reputation  e corresponding to a given choice of a regulatory
entry fee F   0. Taking the difference of the free entry conditions for high and low
quality firms, we have that  e and Y must satisfy
VH( 
e)  VL( e) = K
(1 + s)U 0(Y )
. (17)
This condition states that the price of final output (including the sales subsidy) must
adjust to compensate high quality entrants for the extra cost they incur upon enter-
ing the market with high quality. The entry fee F thus affects final goods production
Y and the final good price P = U 0 (Y ) only indirectly through the effect of the cor-
responding entry reputation level  e on the difference between the value functions
VH( e)  VL( e). For a given P , this gap governs the firm’s incentive to invest in high
quality, so for a given gap in quasi-rents (and associated entry reputation  e), the final
good price P and output Y must adjust to give firms sufficient incentives to invest in
23See our earlier version of this paper (NBER Working Paper 17898) for a treatment of our model in
continuous time.
24A smaller market size (and correspondingly higher P ) would also increase the low quality firms’
information rents. By dividing through by VH , we measure low quality firms’ information rents rela-
tive to the high quality firms’ surplus, which is independent of P , and the entry fee F , relative to the
total entry cost F +K of high quality entrants.
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high quality.
At the same time, we see that since VH( e) > VL( e) for all  e < 1, the equilibrium
production of the final good Y is increasing in the sales subsidy s. The subsidy can
thus be used to offset the impact of entry fees on final goods production Y . With-
out such a subsidy, since whenever ↵H < 1, VH( e)   VL( e) approaches zero as  e
approaches one, a regulator using entry fees alone (s fixed) must eventually face a
tradeoff in using those fees between raising the average quality of entrants  e and
reducing the size of market Y .
From these considerations, we obtain two main results showing how the use of reg-
ulatory tools F and s complements the role of reputation to improve the average
quality of entering firms  e and/or bring the production of the final consumption
good Y closer to its full information socially optimal levels.
4.1 Regulation Based on Both Entry Fees and Subsidies
First, we show that it is possible to choose policies F and s to implement welfare in
steady state arbitrarily close to welfare in the full information first best outcome.
Proposition 5 Regulation based on fees to entry and subsidies to final good sales.
There exists a combination of F and s that implements a steady-state allocation with Y = Y¯
and  e = 1  ✏ for any ✏ > 0, with steady-state welfare approaching the full information first
best level as ✏ approaches zero.
The result follows directly from the previous discussion: we can implement any entry
reputation that is arbitrarily close to the full information level ( e = 1   ✏) by setting
F so that VL(1  ✏)/VH(1  ✏) = F/ (F +K). Next, we set the corresponding subsidy
to implement the first-best output level:
VH(1  ✏)  VL(1  ✏) = K
(1 + s)U 0(Y¯ )
.
With these values of F and s, low quality firms disappear at the same rate as the entry
reputation converges to 1, and the measure of high quality firms in the steady state,
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the equilibrium consumption of the numeraire good N , and hence the steady-state
welfare level all approach their full information first best values.
This result highlights the forces through which entry regulation improves on the
laissez-faire benchmark by restoring restores incentives for quality investments: the
entry fee serves to extract the rents of low quality entrants, shifting the quality mix
at entry towards more and more high quality firms, while the subsidy serves to of-
fer high quality entrants a sufficient investment incentive. The combination of an
upfront fee with a price subsidy introduces de facto backloading of rewards, which
aligns private and social marginal values of investment.
Remark on spot transactions and lack of private commitment: If buyer-seller interactions
were repeated and long-term contracts between a buyer and seller could be enforced,
then the two parties could design an incentive contract guaranteeing that most sellers
entering into the contract are high-quality. Such contracts commit to a deferred com-
pensation scheme with low initial prices, and an extra reward to the firm in the future
which is based on the performance of its signals. The lemons problem thus manifests
itself in combination with lack of commitment to pay anything other than spot prices,
and the fact that spot market prices do not offer firms sufficient incentives to invest in
high quality. Regulation is thus a remedy to the lack of private commitment power.
Remark on budget balance: We have assumed that the regulator has access to lump sum
taxes and transfer to fund the intervention, and have not imposed budget balance be-
tween the entry fee and the price subsidy. Budget balance would impose restrictions
on how closely one can approximate the unconstrained first best. The government
revenues from entry taxes are Fme per period, and in the case of implementing an al-
location arbitrarily close to the full information first best (i.e.  e ! 1), revenues are au-
tomatically bounded, since F ! VL(1)U 0(Y¯ ) by free entry and me ! (1  !¯) Y¯ /y(1).
Expenditures on subsidies on the other hand are sU 0(Y )Y per period, and s becomes
arbitrarily large as  e ! 1. Budget balance thus limits the extent to which tax policies
can approximate the first-best allocation.25
Remark on non-Markov transfers: Our assumption that subsidies are based on transac-
tions rather than the full history of signals for each firm is restrictive. The standard
result that a reputation of   = 1 is an absorbing state implies that VL(1) = VH(1), so it
25In addition, if the price subsidies must be funded through distortionary taxes, then the welfare
gains from optimal regulation have to be balanced against the welfare costs of tax distortions.
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is impossible to completely avoid entry by low quality firms. If instead the regulator
was able to make transfers based on a firm’s full history of signals about quality, then
it would be possible to implement an allocation with  e = 1. This is not possible
with transfers that are Markov in reputation because buyers ignore further signals of
quality once   = 1. Still, the welfare costs of ruling out complete signal contingent
transfers are negligible, as simple transaction subsidies and entry fees as the ones
discussed above already get us arbitrarily close to the full information benchmark.
4.2 Regulation Based Only on Entry Fees
Our second main result shows that entry fees alone can improve on the laissez-faire
equilibrium. We first provide a representation of the household’s steady-state utility
as a strictly increasing function of both Y and  e, in the limit as   ! 1. Whenever
VH( e)   VL( e) is increasing in the entry reputation for  e close to  , small positive
entry fees will simultaneously increase aggregate production Y and the entry reputa-
tion  e, i.e. there is no trade-off between quality and aggregate production and small
entry fees unambiguously increase welfare.
Proposition 6 Regulation just based on fees to entry (s = 0).
(i) If   is sufficiently close to 1, then a small positive entry fee is unambiguously welfare-
enhancing.
(ii) Moreover, such small positive entry fee unambiguously increases both aggregate output
Y and entry reputation  e.
For (i), we first obtain a representation of welfare in terms of Y and  e in the limiting
case where   ! 1. In this case, aggregate output is given by
Y = me ( eVH( 
e) + (1   e)VL( e)) , (18)
which using the free entry conditions can be represented as Y U 0 (Y ) = me ( eK + F ).
The resources of the numeraire good spent on investing in high quality entrants is
then given by





and steady-state welfare is




Therefore, it is immediate that any F > 0 that results in an increase in Y unambigu-
ously increases welfare. But the result goes a step further in proving that evenwith an
immediate tradeoff between increasing  e and reducing Y , the former always domi-
nates the welfare calculus. This follows from the observation that the good firms’ free
entry condition imposes an upper bound on the potential output loss due to the entry
distortion. The welfare gain from a small positive entry fee ( e >  elf ) is




0 (Ylf ) .
From the good firms’ entry conditions, we have U 0 (Ylf ) = K/VH( elf ) > K/VH( e) =
K/ (K + F ) · U 0 (Y ), which bounds the rate at which an entry fee reduces output. In-
troducing this bound, and combiningwith the fact thatU (Y ) U (Ylf ) > U 0 (Y ) (Y   Ylf ),
due to concavity of U (·) we then obtain that the welfare gain from a small positive
entry fee is at least










But when F is sufficiently close to 0, and Y sufficiently close to Ylf , this expression
must be strictly positive.
For (ii) we simply need to check that VH( e)  VL( e) is increasing in the entry repu-
tation for  e close to  . In the Single trial version, this is immediate since
VH( 
e)  VL( e) = (↵H   ↵L)  !¯
1   !¯y( 
g( e)), (21)
and y( g( e)) is increasing in  e (unless ↵L = 0, in which case  g( e) = 1 and output
does not change with  e). Because the high quality firm is more likely to receive a
good signal and continue with positive profits, it also has to gain more at the margin
from a better entry reputation.
The argument is more involved for the Bernoulli trials version. Here, we consider the
thought experiment of comparing the laissez-faire benchmark against an intervention
that sets the entry reputation  e =  g( ) >  , equivalent to the occurrence of a single
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good signal relative to  . From the Bellman equations at  , we have












i.e. the (positive) flow value of a high type firm at the exit threshold corresponds to
the (negative) flow profits plus the expected flow value from obtaining a good signal.
Similarly, for a low type firm, we have














exactly offset the low type’s value of
a positive signal. Combining these equations, we obtain an expression for the change














which is positive whenever








Intuitively speaking, the exit condition for low types equates the current flow losses to
the low type’s expected value of a good signal. But then the high-types flow value is
proportional to the difference between the option values of good signals, which maps
into the difference in value functions when ↵H is close to ↵L (e.g. in any continuous
time limit, in which a given positive signal carries little information). But since the
high-types’ flow value must be strictly positive, so must be the difference in the value
of a good signal, and hence we have that a small positive intervention raising the
entry reputation to  g( ) increases output.
In the symmetric Bernoulli trials case that we consider, VH( )  VL( ) is increasing in
  for all   sufficiently close to  . If   is sufficiently large, however, a tradeoff between
quality and production eventually emerges. Thus, the optimal entry fee is positive
but remains finite. Such a tradeoff also emerges eventually in the Single Trial ver-
sion of our model, once  e gets sufficiently large such that  b( e) >  . Condition (22)
further suggests that this scenario is more broadly representative of our model, e.g.
output is at first increasing in  e, whenever the flow of signals is sufficiently informa-
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tive relative, but any given positive signal carries little information, and a tradeoff be-
tween quality and aggregate production must eventually emerge, whenever ↵H < 1
and lim !1 VL( ) = lim !1 VH( ) = VH(1).
Remark on Bernoulli trials with asymmetric signals: With the exception of Propositions
4 and 6(ii), none of our results or proofs made use of the restriction to symmetric
signals that we introduced earlier; they therefore extend directly to arbitrary signal
structures with Bernoulli trials. To discuss the role of asymmetries for these two re-
maining results, we consider two tractable versions of our model with Bernoulli trials
with asymmetric signals. First, in the bad news case, the probability that the high qual-
ity firm receives a bad signal is zero, but such signal is realized with positive proba-
bility for low quality firms in each period (↵H = 1 > ↵L > 0). Second, in the good news
case, the probability that the low quality firm receives a good signal is zero, but such
signal is realized with positive probability for high quality firms (1 > ↵H > ↵L = 0).
In Appendix C, we provide closed form solutions for the value functions of these
two cases, and show that proposition 4 also holds, even though the original proof
requires some adjustments. Interesting differences emerge with regards to part (ii)
of Proposition 6, however. In the bad news case the difference between the value
functions VH( )   VL( ) increases in   for all   greater than the exit threshold and,
hence, there is no tradeoff for the regulator between raising the entry reputation  e
and the stationary output of the final consumption good Y when choosing an entry
fee. Moreover, as lim !1 VL( ) < lim !1 VH( ), regulation can implement an entry
reputation  e = 1  ✏ for arbitrarily small ✏ with a bounded entry fee F .
Condition (22), however, does not help us in the good news case in which ↵L = 0,
i.e. even a single good signal remains highly informative of the firms’ quality. In this
case, there is an immediate tradeoff emerging between entry reputation and aggre-
gate output. Nevertheless, part (i) of our proposition still applies so optimal entry
fees remain positive. The impact of F on Y is potentially ambiguous because F and
 e has two effects on the composition of high and low quality firms that operate in
the stationary equilibrium. Holding fixed low quality firms’ exit decisions, an in-
crease in the entry reputation increases the ratio of high quality to low quality firms
overall, which lowers the investment of the numeraire good required to produce a
given level of the final consumption good Y . However, in equilibrium, the continu-
ation decision of low quality firms must adjust to keep the exit reputation at  . That
is, an increase in the entry reputation also lowers the rate at which low quality firms
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exit and therefore increases their life expectancy at entry. This indirect effect of F on
average quality through the life expectance of low quality entrants accounts for the
difference between the two cases we consider: with bad news, the life expectancy of
low quality entrants is independent of  e, while with good news, the effect of delayed
exit by low quality firms becomes very strong.
Remark on the impact of F on numeraire consumption and welfare: The same considera-
tions also complicate accounting for the impact of regulation on the consumption of
N and therefore make welfare calculations more subtle. The exception is the limiting
case of   ! 1, where we canmake use of the steady-state equivalence between the net
present value of new entrants and the cross-sectional distribution of currently active
firms to arrive at the simple characterization of numeraire good consumption above.
Remark on the welfare impact of regulation: The magnitude of the impact of regulation
on welfare is non-monotonic in the precision of signals. When the precision of sig-
nals goes to zero, entry fees do not increase Y much, since the difference between
value functions is negligible. However, since the production of the final good is very
small, the marginal welfare gain can still be important. At the other extreme, when
the precision of signals goes to infinity, there is not much room for improvement on
the market outcome to be achieved through regulation, since this outcome is already
close to the unconstrained first best. This suggests that regulatory policies are most
effective in improving the outcome of a market with spot prices when the precision
of signals is intermediate.
Remarks on other regulatory tools: Naturally, a regulator can use other regulatory tools,
in addition to entry fees, to increase welfare. For example, if a regulator can observe
that a firm remains active, then it can also offer operation subsidies or impose taxes
on active firms. Such subsidies or taxes may be helpful in discouraging low-quality
firms from continuing operations, or disproportionately rewarding high-quality firms
to remain active. Depending on this trade-off, operational taxes or subsidies may
complement entry fees in increasing welfare.
Policies that subsidize variables more likely to be experienced by high-quality firms,
such as age, or that punish variables more likely to be experienced by low-quality
firms, such as exit, can also be exploited. Even though such variables are only imper-
fect signals of reputations, their incidence may be influenced through the design of
the tax policy (e.g. low-quality firms may decide to continue longer if they expect to
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obtain benefits from age-contingent subsidies), andmay be not as easily manipulable,
the regulator can design a wide array of policy combinations to impact welfare. Our
model offers a simple framework for analyzing the impact of such policies.
5 Conclusions
Most businesses in virtually all countries require licenses to operate, adding substan-
tial costs to the creation of new businesses. The Pigouvian rationale in favor of such
regulation is typically based on a concern for the quality of products offered by the
entering firms. Yet in practice most entry regulations seem unrelated to explicit con-
cerns about the quality of products offered by these new entrants.
In this paper we have developed a general equilibrium model in which firm entry,
growth and exit are all driven by uncertainty and learning about the firms’ product
quality, and used this model to analyze the impact of entry regulation on product
quality, overall production and welfare. Our analysis offers a theoretical foundation
for the Pigouvian argument: through a combination of entry fees and price subsidies,
a regulator can improve on the laisser-faire outcome with spot market transactions:
entry fees discourage firms from entering with low quality products, and through the
subsidy a regulator can align the entering high quality firms’ incentives with social
surplus. Even when the entry fee is the only regulatory tool available, imposing such
a fee is strictly welfare improving, and typically does not result in a distortion of
market prices and output levels, at least when the fee is small.
In our model, we have assumed that quality is fixed on entry, yet in many respects
maintaining quality is an ongoing concern. An important direction for future research
is therefore to extend our analysis of regulation tomodels with ongoingmoral hazard.
We conjecture that some of our core insights also extend to such a setting: to the
extent that the market recognizes and rewards quality imperfectly and with a delay,
the laissez-faire incentives for quality investments will be too weak to compensate the
seller sufficiently for maintaining a high reputation, so there should again be scope
for regulatory interventions that appropriately backload rewards. But the required
transfer schemes are likely significantly more complex, and fall outside the scope of
what we can solve for at this time.26
26See, for example, Marvel and McCafferty (1984), Maksimovic and Titman (1991), and, more re-
31
References
Arnott, Richard, Bruce Greenwald, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1993. “Information and
Economic Efficiency.” NBER Working Paper 4533.
Bar-Isaac, Heski. 2003. “Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling
Model.” Review of Economic Studies 70 (2): 231–251.
Board, Simon, andMoritz Meyer-ter Vehn. 2010. “Reputation for Quality.” Working
Paper, UCLA.
. 2012. “A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics.” Working Paper, UCLA.
Daley, Brendan, and Brett Green. 2012. “Waiting for News in the Market for
Lemons.” Econometrica 80:1433–1504.
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer.
2002. “The Regulation of Entry.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (1): 1–37.
Ethier, Wilfred. 1982. “National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern
Theory of International Trade.” American Economic Review 72:389–405.
Faingold, Eduardo, and Yuliy Sannikov. 2011. “Reputation in Continuous-Time
Games.” Econometrica 79 (3): 773–876.
Fattal Jaef, Roberto. 2013. “Entry, Exit adn Misallocation Frictions.” Working Paper,
UCLA.
Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson. 2012. “The Slow Growth of
New Plants: Learning about Demand?” NBER Working Paper 17853.
Garcia-Fontes, Walter, and Hugo Hopenhayn. 2000. “Entry Restrictions and the
Determination of Quality.” Spanish Economic Review 2 (2): 105–127.
Herrendorf, Berthold, and Arilton Teixeira. 2011. “Barriers to Entry and Develop-
ment.” International Economic Review 52:573–602.
Hopenhayn, Hugo. 1992. “Entry, Exit and Firms Dynamics in Long Run Equilib-
rium.” Econometrica 60:1127–1150.
Hopenhayn, Hugo, and Richard Rogerson. 1993. “Job Turnover and Policy Evalua-
tion: A General Equilibrium Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 101:915–938.
Ho¨rner, Johannes. 2002. “Reputation and Competition.” American Economic Review
92 (3): 644–663.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter J. Klenow. 2009. “Misallocation and Manufacturing
TFP in China and India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4): 1403–1448.
Klein, Benjamin, and Keith B. Leffler. 1981. “The Role of Market forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (4): 615–641.
cently, Board and Meyer-ter Vehn (2010) for theoretical developments along similar lines.
32
Leland, Hayne E. 1979. “Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum
Quality Standards.” Journal of Political Economy 87 (6): 1328–1346.
Luttmer, Erzo. 2007. “Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 122:1103–1144.
MacLeod, W. Bentley. 2007. “Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforce-
ment.” Journal of Economic Literature 45 (3): 595–628.
Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson. 2001. “Who Wants a Good Reputation?”
Review of Economic Studies 68 (2): 415–441.
Maksimovic, Vojislav, and Sheridan Titman. 1991. “Financial Policy and Reputation
for Product Quality.” Review of Financial Studies 4 (1): 175–200.
Marvel, Howard P., and Stephen McCafferty. 1984. “Resale Price Maintenance and
Quality Certification.” RAND Journal of Economics 15 (3): 346–359.
Melitz, Marc. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Ag-
gregate Industry Productivity.” Econometrica 71:1695–1725.
Parente, Stephen, and Edward Prescott. 1999. “Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to
Riches.” American Economic Review 89:1215–1233.
Pigou, Arthur. 1938. The Economics of Welfare. London: MacMillan and Co.
Prat, Julien, and Carlos Alos-Ferrer. 2010. “Job Market Signaling and Employer
Learning.” Working Paper, IAE-CSIC.
Prescott, Edward C., and Robert M. Townsend. 1984. “Pareto Optima and Compet-
itive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.” Econometrica 52 (1):
21–45.
Restuccia, Diego, and Richard Rogerson. 2008. “Policy Distortions and Aggregate
Productivity with Heterogeneous Establishments.” Review of Economic Dynamics
11:707–720.
Shaked, Avner, and John Sutton. 1981. “The Self-Regulating Profession.” Review of
Economic Studies 48 (2): 217–234.
Shapiro, Carl. 1983. “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputa-
tions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (4): 659–680.
. 1986. “Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing.” Review of
Economic Studies 53 (5): 843–862.
Tadelis, Steven. 1999. “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 89 (3): 548–563.
. 2002. “The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism.” Journal of
Political Economy 110 (4): 854–882.
Vial, Bernardita, and Felipe Zurita. 2012. “Reputation-driven Industry Dynamics.”
Working Paper, Universidad Catolica de Chile.
33
A Proofs of Propositions
We begin with two lemmas that will be used in the subsequent equilibrium charac-
terization and uniqueness results.
Lemma 1: Suppose that  c (·) is non-decreasing. Then, Vi (·) is non-decreasing in  , and
strictly increasing whenever !i ( ) > 0. Moreover, VH ( )   VL ( ), and VH ( ) > VL ( ),
whenever !L ( ) > 0.
Proof:Whenever  c (·) is non-decreasing, the Bellman operator Ti :




y ( ) +  ↵iV ( 




preserves continuity and monotonicity, and represents a contraction. By standard
arguments, it therefore has a unique fixed point Vi (·) which is continuous and non-
decreasing in  . Moreover, whenever !i ( ) > 0, we have, for  0 >   that
Vi ( 
0)  Vi ( )   !i ( ) {y ( 0)  y ( ) +  ↵i [Vi ( g ( c ( 0)))  Vi ( g ( c ( )))]





   Vi   b ( c ( )) ⇤ 
  !i ( ) (y ( 0)  y ( )) > 0,
and
(THVL) ( )  VL ( )   !L ( )   (↵H   ↵L)
 
VL ( 








, and therefore VH ( ) >
(THVL) ( ) > VL ( ).⌅
Lemma 2: Consider interim belief functions  c (·),  ˆc (·), e c (·), such that e c ( )   c ( ) 
 ˆc ( ) for all  . Suppose further that  ˆc (·) and e c (·) are non-decreasing in  . Then the
corresponding value functions Vi (·), Vˆi (·), and eVi (·) satisfy eVi ( )  Vi ( )  Vˆi ( ), for all
 .
Proof: Let Ti, Tˆi and eTi denote the Bellman operators associated with interim belief
functions  c (·),  ˆc (·), e c (·), such that e c ( )   c ( )   ˆc ( ) for all  . We wish to
show that the fixed point for Ti is bounded by the fixed points for Tˆi and eTi. For a























y ( ) +  ↵iVˆi ( 














( ), and since Ti is monotonic,
n
T (k)i Vˆi (·)
o
is a decreasing
sequence of functions, converging to Vi (·). Therefore Vi ( )  Vˆi ( ), for all  . The
argument to show that eVi ( )  Vi ( ) for all   is analogous.⌅
It follows from this lemma that we can bound equilibrium beliefs and value functions
by focusing on the highest and lowest interim belief functions.
Proof of Proposition 1: Follows directly from the construction of value functions and
interim beliefs provided in the text.⌅
Proof of Proposition 2:Using lemma 2, we can bound value functions at any equilib-
rium by using the ”extreme” interim beliefs. Any interim beliefs for which  c( )    
for all   2 [0, 1] result in a firm value function Vi (·)   V ⇤i (·), where V ⇤i (·) is the value
function characterized by the Bellman equation with  c( ) =  . Since for all      ,
VH ( )   VL ( )   V ⇤L ( ) > 0, it follows that at any equilibrium, low- (and high-)
quality firm with   >   strictly prefer to continue, implying that !H ( ) = !L ( ) = !¯
and  c( ) =  .
Next, we show that at any equilibrium,  c( )    for any     : if to the contrary,
 c( ) >   >   then the value of low quality firms would be strictly positive (since the
value is bounded below by VL ( c( ))   V ⇤L ( c( )) > 0). But then, !L( ) = !¯ from
which it follows that necessarily  c( )    - a contradiction. Therefore, using lemma
2, we bound value functions at any equilibrium by using the ”extreme” interim beliefs




. Since they both sustain the same value V ⇤L (·) for
low quality firms, it follows that the low-type value function is uniquely determined
in any equilibrium.
Moreover, given the value function for low types, it follows that whenever  c( ) <  ,
y ( c( )) +  ↵LV ⇤L ( 










= 0 so low quality firms have
a strict incentive to exit. For each  , we are thus left with two possibilities: either
the low quality firms mix over exit in such a way that  c( ) =  , or the high-quality
firms and low quality firms both exit with probability 1, so that continuation is an
off-equilibrium event.
Now consider the high quality firm’s incentives. In any equilibrium, let  ˆ    denote
the lowest reputation level such that any firm with reputation   >  ˆ continue with








. For a high quality
firm with reputation     ˆ, s.t.  g ( ) >  ˆ, we have that
y ( c( )) +  ↵HVH ( 
g ( c( )))   y ( ) +  ↵HVH ( g ( ))
  y ( ) +  ↵HVH
 
 
    y ( ) +  ↵HV ⇤H     ,
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where the first inequality follows from ”continuation signals quality”, the second
from the fact that  g ( ) >  ˆ and therefore  c ( g ( )) =  , and the third uses the
bound on VH (·) implied by lemma 2. If y (0) +  ↵HV ⇤H
 
 
    0, this last expression
is strictly positive, implying that any firm slightly below  ˆ must strictly prefer to
continue - contradicting the definition  ˆ, if  ˆ > 0. Therefore, it must be the case
that  ˆ = 0, so that interim beliefs are uniquely determined for all strictly positive
reputation levels.⌅
Proof of Proposition 3: Follows immediately from VH ( ) < VH (1) = !¯1  !¯y (1).⌅
Proof of Proposition 4:We prove this result for the single signal version of the model,
and defer the proof for the Bernoulli trials versionwith symmetric signals to appendix
B and with two cases of asymmetric signals (good news and bad news cases) to ap-
pendix C.
Write  g( ) ⌘  g( ; ↵H↵L ) to make explicit the dependence of the posterior belief on the
informativeness of a good signal. From Bayes Rule we have that  g( ; ↵H↵L ) is strictly
increasing in   and in ↵H↵L for all 0 <   < 1. Let   = F ( 
g; ↵H↵L ) denote the inverse of
 g( ; ↵H↵L ). Notice that F is strictly increasing in 0 <  
g < 1 and strictly decreasing in
↵H
↵L
. Recall in addition that in the single signal version, y( g( elf ;
↵H
↵L
)) > 0 > y( elf ).
From the free entry conditions, we have that  elf and Ylf satisfy














)) =  y( elf )
It is useful to rewrite these conditions in terms of  g as









g) =  y(F ( g; ↵H
↵L
)) (24)
In equation (24), the LHS is increasing in ↵L and in  g, while the RHS is decreasing in
 g and ↵L, and increasing in ↵H . Therefore, the solution  g (↵H ,↵L) to (24) is strictly
increasing in ↵H and strictly decreasing in ↵L. But then an increase in ↵H or a de-
crease in ↵L both increase the LHS of equation (23), which implies that Ylf must also
increase.⌅
Proof of Proposition 5: Follows directly from the arguments in the main text.⌅
Proof of Proposition 6: Part (i) We prove the result by showing that the result holds
in the limit as   ! 1, for  e sufficiently close to  . The result then applies for   ! 1
36
sufficiently small because of continuity. Steady-state welfare can bewritten as U (Y )+
1 me eK. In the limit as   ! 1, we have that Y = me ( eVH ( e) + (1   e)VL ( e)),
due to the equivalence (in the absence of time discounting) between an entering firms’
expected discounted future profits over time, and the cross-section of firms’ current
profits at any given period. But then, steady-state welfare takes the form
W (Y, e) = U (Y ) + 1   
eK
 eVH ( e) + (1   e)VL ( e) · Y
= U (Y ) + 1   
eK
 eK + F
· U 0 (Y )Y .
Now, for a small entry fee F , we have
W (Y, e) W  Ylf , elf  = U (Y )   eK eK + F · U 0 (Y )Y   U (Ylf ) + U 0 (Ylf )Ylf




, and welfare is strictly higher with a small
entry fee. Suppose therefore that Y < Ylf . Now, notice that for  e >  elf , we have





U 0 (Y )
U 0 (Ylf )
K,
and therefore U 0 (Ylf )   K/ (F +K) · U 0 (Y ), and
W (Y, e) W  Ylf , elf    U (Y )  U (Ylf )  U 0 (Y )✓  eK eK + F Y   KK + F Ylf
◆
















but since  eK + F < K + F (strictly also when F = 0), it follows that it is always
possible to find a Ylf   Y > 0 sufficiently close to 0 that is implemented with a F
sufficiently close to 0 (by continuity) such that Y/ ( eK + F ) > Ylf/ (K + F ), and





Part (ii): This is immediate for the Single signal case, given equation (21). We show
in Appendix B, for Bernoulli trails with symmetric signals, that equation (22) holds.⌅
B Bernoulli Trials with Symmetric Signals
In this section we provide analytical solutions to the symmetric signals cases of the
Bernoulli trials version of our model. For tractability, we express value functions in
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i.e. the odds ratio that a firm is of low type (from now on ”low type odds ratio”). The
firm’s reputation is   (l) = 1/(1 + l). We denote the value functions Vi, per period
output y and continuation strategies !i in terms of this low type odds ratio, l. The
updating from continuation, good and bad signals respectively takes the form:
lc (l) = l · !L (l) /!H (l) , lg (l) = l · ↵L/↵H and lb (l) = l · (1  ↵L) / (1  ↵H) .
We let le and l denote the low type odds ratio at entry and at the exit point for low
type firms. With the transformation, 0 < le  l.
With symmetric signals, ↵H = 1 ↵L. Let ⌘ = ↵L/↵H 2 (0, 1), then ↵H = 1/ (1 + ⌘) and
↵L = ⌘/ (1 + ⌘). Because of symmetry good and bad signals exactly off-set each other




= l. Starting from an entry reputation of l, the firm’s
reputation therefore increases or decreases along a discrete ladder: l 2 {l0, l1, ...},
where lk = l · ⌘k. The first time the firm accumulates strictly more bad signals than
good signals, a low quality firm exits with positive probability to compensate for the
corresponding loss in reputation.
Equilibrium value functions: The value function of a firm of type i 2 {H,L} solves
the Bellman equation
Vi (lk) = !¯ (y (lk) +  ↵iVi (lk+1) +   (1  ↵i)Vi (lk 1))
together with VL (l 1) = VL (l0) = !¯ (y (l0) +  ↵LVL (l1)) = 0 for low-quality firms
and VH (l 1) = VH (l0) > 0 for high-quality firms. Now, define ⌦i (k) ⌘ !¯ ↵iVi (lk)  











The Bellman equation can then be rewritten as
!¯ ↵iVi (lk+1)   Vi (lk) + !¯y (lk) = (1   )Vi (lk)  !¯  (1  ↵i)Vi (lk 1) ,
or ⌦i (k) = (!¯ ↵i/ (1   )) (⌦i (k + 1) + !¯y (lk)) .
Next, define b (⌘) ⌘ !¯ ↵H/ (1   ), and notice that
b (⌘) ⌘ !¯ ↵H
1    =
2!¯ 
1 + ⌘ +
q
(1 + ⌘)2   4 (!¯ )2 ⌘
< !¯ ,
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so that !¯ ↵L/ (1   ) = ⌘b (⌘) < b (⌘) < 1. It follows that























1 + l · ⌘t .




= (y(1)  y(0)) 11+l·⌘t   ( y(0)).
In the same vein, the value of high types at the exit point l is given by
VH (l) =
⌦H (0)

































where the last step follows from adding and subtracting 1  b(⌘):
1  !¯ 
!¯ ↵H    b (⌘) = 1  b (⌘) +
(1  !¯ ) !¯ ↵H   (!¯ ↵H    ) (1   ) + (!¯ ↵H    ) !¯ ↵H
(!¯ ↵H    ) (1   )
= 1  b (⌘) +   (1   )  (!¯ )
2 ↵H (1  ↵H)
(!¯ ↵H    ) (1   ) = 1  b (⌘) .
Continuity and Differentiability: Finally, consider l /2 {l0, l1, ...}. Starting from any
l 2 [l0, l1], a firm’s reputation evolves on a discrete grid {l, l⌘, l⌘2, ...} until the first
instant the number of bad signals exceeds the number of good signals. At this point,
a low-type firm exits with positive probability, and the continuing firms’ reputation
shifts to l. Since it is always optimal for low type firms to exit the first time the firm
experiences more bad than good signals (and for high types never to exit), we can
use this strategy to define the firm’s expected payoffs VL (·) and VH (·), and since per
period payoffs are decreasing, continuous and differentiable in l, it follows that these
value functions are decreasing, continuous and differentiable over l 2 [l0, l1] (with
left- and right-continuous differentiability at the boundaries).
The same argument extends to any interval l 2 [lk 1, lk] with exit by low types the
first time that the number of bad signals exceeds the number of good signals by k.
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We therefore have that the value functions are decreasing, continuous and piece-wise
differentiable, with kinks possible along the grid l 2 {l0, l1, ...}.
Monotonicity of Laissez-Faire outcome (Proposition 4):Write VL (l; ⌘), VH (l; ⌘) and
l (⌘) to indicate the dependence of value functions and the exit threshold w.r.t. the in-
formational parameter ⌘. The high quality firms’ free entry condition is K/U 0 (Ylf ) =
VH (l (⌘) ; ⌘). Since K/U 0 (Ylf ) is increasing in Ylf , we therefore wish to show that
VH (l (⌘) ; ⌘) is decreasing in ⌘. The condition defining the exit threshold l (⌘) can be
written as F (⌘, l) = 0, where


































1  b (⌘) .
The high type’s value is

























from the equation that determines l(⌘). Then, VH (l (⌘) ; ⌘) is decreasing in ⌘ if and
only if l (⌘) / (⌘) is increasing in ⌘, or equivalently l0 (⌘) /l (⌘) >  0 (⌘) / (⌘). By the
Implicit function Theorem, l0 (⌘) =  F⌘ (⌘, l) /Fl (⌘, l), so that this condition can be
re-written as
F⌘ (⌘, l (⌘)) +
 0 (⌘)
 (⌘)
l (⌘)Fl (⌘, l (⌘)) > 0,
where
Fl (⌘, l (⌘)) =    y(0)





(1 + l (⌘) ⌘t)2
< 0, and
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F⌘ (⌘, l (⌘)) =  
0 (⌘)
 











l (⌘) · t · ⌘t 1
(1 + l (⌘) ⌘t)2




t (b (⌘))t 1   (t+ 1) (b (⌘))t  1













(1 + l (⌘) ⌘t)2
  (⌘) b0 (⌘)
1X
t=0
(t+ 1) (b (⌘))t
✓
1
1 + l (⌘) ⌘t+1
  1










(t+ 1) l (⌘)
(1 + l (⌘) ⌘t+1)2




(t+ 1) l (⌘)
(1 + l (⌘) ⌘t+1) (1 + l (⌘) ⌘t)
From these derivatives, we obtain
F⌘ (⌘, l (⌘)) +
 0 (⌘)
 (⌘)









(1 + l (⌘) ⌘t)2




(t+ 1) l (⌘)
(1 + l · ⌘t+1)2




(t+ 1) l (⌘)
(1 + l · ⌘t+1) (1 + l · ⌘t) .













































 b(⌘)(1  b(⌘)) + b0(⌘)(1  ⌘)
(1  b(⌘))2 , or
 0 (⌘)
 (⌘)
(1  ⌘b (⌘)) = b
0(⌘)(1  ⌘)
1  b(⌘)   b(⌘).
But then it follows immediately that
F⌘ (⌘, l (⌘)) +
 0 (⌘)
 (⌘)












(1 + l (⌘) ⌘t)2
= 0.
Desirability of Positive Entry Fees (Proposition 6): From equation (22), it suffices to
check that
VH (l)     !¯
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     y (l) 1
⌘
(1  ⌘b (⌘)) .





























which holds for all ⌘ < 1.
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C Bernoulli Trials with Asymmetric Signals
In this section we provide analytical solutions to the two extreme cases that we con-
sider of the Bernoulli trials version of our model with asymmetric signals.
C.1 Bad News Signals
In the bad news case, 1 = ↵H > ↵L, i.e. a low quality firm is revealed with positive
probability to be of low quality. A firms’ reputation monotonically increases with
time after entry, until the arrival of a bad signal results in a discrete drop of the firm’s
reputation to 0. Therefore, there is no exit by low quality firms until a bad signal
realizes. The low type odds ratio of a firm that entered t periods ago is le · ↵tL. Let
vi (l) denote the value of a type i firm that stays in the market until a low signal
realizes. A low type firm has a survival probability of !¯↵L per period, so



















since y( ) =  y(1) + (1    )y(0) and   = 1/ (1 + l). A high type firm instead has a
survival probability of !¯:

















Both of these value functions are strictly decreasing, continuous and differentiable in
l. Moreover liml!1 vL (l) = !¯y(0)/ (1   !¯↵L) < 0 < liml!0 vL (l) = !¯y(1)/ (1   !¯↵L),
so there exists a unique value l such that vL (l) = 0. Moreover, from the application of
lemma 1, it follows that vH (l) > vL (l) for all l  l. We have thus established that the
value functions VL (l) = max {0, vL (l)} and VH (l) = vH (max {l, l}), along with exit
threshold l, sustain the equilibrium that is characterized in propostion 1 and shown
to be unique when ”Continuation implies quality” under proposition 2.
Moreover, notice that the two value functions evaluated at l, vH (l) and vL (l), take
exactly the same form as in the symmetric signals case, with b (⌘) set equal to  !¯ and
⌘ set equal to ↵L. Therefore, it is straight-forward to check that the proofs for propo-
sitions 4 and 6 extend directly to the bad news scenario. Therefore, vH (l (↵L) ;↵L)
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and Ylf are decreasing in ↵L (proposition 4), and targeting the entry reputation to l↵L
strictly increases output and welfare (proposition 6).
In fact, proposition 6 can even be strengthened by noting that
vH (l)  vL (l)












v0H (l)  v0L (l)







(1 + l · ↵tL)2
< 0,
i.e. any decrease in l (increase in entry reputation) unambiguously raises aggregate
output - i.e. in the bad news model, the tradeoff between quality and market size
never materializes.
C.2 Good News Signals
In the good news case, ↵H > ↵L = 0, i.e. a high quality firm is revealed with pos-
itive probability to be of high quality. A firms’ reputation monotonically decreases
with time after entry, until either a good signal results in a discrete jump of the firms’
reputation to 1, or low quality firms start to exit with a positive rate once their value
reaches zero. In this case, by Bayes’rule a firm with reputation l that doesn’t experi-
ence a good signal has its reputation updated to l/ (1  ↵H) > l, unless l/ (1  ↵H) > l,
in which case its reputation remains at l (and low-quality firms exit with positive
probability).
Equilibrium value functions: Since the value of low-quality firms always remains at
0 at the laissez-faire benchmark, we have that y (l) = 0, or 11+l =  y (0) / (y (1)  y (0)),
i.e. static flow profits of a newly entering firm must be zero. For l < l, a low-quality
firm’s value function is







1 + l · (1  ↵H) t
   y (0)
y (1)  y (0)
 












At the laisser-faire benchmark, the high quality firms then earn zero profits until a
good signal about their quality results in a jump of their reputation to 1. Hence the
high quality firms’ value function at the laissez-faire benchmark solves
VH (l) = !¯  (↵HVH (1) + (1  ↵H)VH (l)) = !¯ ↵H
1  !¯  (1  ↵H)VH (1) ,
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where VH (1) = !¯1  !¯y (1). For l < l, the high quality firm earns positive flow profits
until its reputation reaches l in the absence of a good signal. Hence for l < l, its value
function is
VH (l) = !¯ (y (l) +  ↵HVH (1) +   (1  ↵H)VH (l/ (1  ↵H)))
= !¯ (y (1)  y (0))
1X
t=0










1  !¯  (1  ↵H)VH (1) .
Clearly these two value functions are continuous in l, strictly decreasing, and piece-
wise differentiable, with kinks possible only if l 2  l, l (1  ↵H) , l (1  ↵H)2 , ... .
Monotonicity of Ylf (Proposition 4):We need to show that VH (l (↵H) ,↵H) is increas-
ing in the arrival probability of the good signal ↵H . But this result follows immedi-
ately from the fact that !¯ ↵H/ (1  !¯  (1  ↵H)) is strictly increasing in ↵H .
Desirability of positive entry fees (Proposition 6): Notice that
VH (l)  VL (l) = !¯ ↵H
1  !¯  (1  ↵H)VH (1)
















i.e. the gap VH (le)  VL (le), and hence the equilibrium market size, is strictly increas-
ing in l, or decreasing in entry reputation  e. On the other hand, still applies so for
sufficiently small entry fees, the positive impact on entrant quality more than offsets
the negative impact of smaller equilibrium market size.
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